出版日期：2015-09-01 00:00:00

著者：Jin-Lung Peng; Kili C Wang

出版者：European Group of Risk Insurance Economist

著錄名稱、卷期、頁數：The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 40(2), p.102-132

摘要：We investigate the problem of asymmetric information among the different distribution channels of bancassurance, namely, over-the-counter (OTC) selling and telephone marketing (TM). We predict that the bank could bring an information advantage to insurance companies through telephone marketing by providing a customer list based on the customers’ records in the bank. Bancassurance can play a role of integrating the information that is transferred from the bank to the insurance company. Our empirical evidence shows that, in contrast to the over-the-counter customers, there is less evidence of adverse selection, and there is also less evidence of moral hazard or fraud among the telephone marketing customers that have been sorted by the bank. This phenomenon could be attributed to the valuable private information provided by the credit records of customers kept by the bank.

關鍵字：bancassurance;information asymmetry;distribution channel

語言：en

ISSN：1554-9658

期刊性質：國外

收錄於：SSCI

審稿制度：是

國別：GBR

出版型式：電子版