出版日期：2018-11-01 00:00:00

著者：Sangyong Han; Gene C.Lai; Chia-LingHo

著錄名稱、卷期、頁數：Journal of Banking & Finance 96, p.379-392

摘要：Using a sample of US publicly traded property-liability insurers, we examine the effect of corporate transparency on earnings management. We find that a higher level of corporate transparency is associated with more conservative loss-reserves estimation. Our evidence shows that the positive effect of corporate transparency on insurers’ reserves-estimate conservatism is more pronounced for insurers that are smaller and have more diversified lines of business and that certain board characteristics—such as being smaller, meeting more frequently, and having a higher percentage of independent directors—can restrain the inadequate reserves management of less transparent US publicly traded property-liability insurers. We also provide evidence that additional regulatory mandates to seek greater transparency in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be redundant, given the existing regulations in the property-liability insurance industry. Finally, we find insurers’ conservative reserve estimates were more pronounced during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

關鍵字：Corporate transparency;Financial crisis;Reserve management;SOX

語言：en_US

ISSN：0378-4266;1872-6372

期刊性質：國外

收錄於：SSCI Scopus

審稿制度：是

國別：USA

出版型式：電子版,紙本